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LEVINAS AND THE VISIBILITY OF 
GOD: A “SEEING” THAT DOES NOT 
KNOW WHAT IT SEES 
corEy bEals
Can we see God or not? Is God visible or invisible? These questions extend to several others, but first I should clarify what I mean, 
since there are so many ways in which we can speak of visibility. One 
could speak of visual perception—the way you might see a bird or a 
firefly, or another person walking toward you down the path. But one 
could also speak of vision in conceptual terms—the way I see the way 
to solve a problem, or in the way I see that the angles of a triangle add 
up to the sum of two right angles, or in the way that I say, “Do you see 
what I mean?” In this second sense, vision amounts to understanding, 
or knowledge. It is primarily in this second sense that I am asking 
the question about the visibility of God, and this conceptual sense of 
vision can even be taken to include, more generally, knowledge, and 
speech about what we conceptually see. So the questions within the 
question of God’s visibility include: “Can I know God? If so, can I 
know God directly? If so, can I speak of God? If so, when and how 
can God be known?”
I admit that this is a most difficult topic to think about, and that 
my approach to it will not be to lay out a set of definitive, prescriptive 
answers. Nor will I be pursuing a strictly scholarly analysis of the 
question. Rather, I intend to talk about my wrestling with these 
questions, and I will also tell about my advances and injuries so far. 
This has been a struggle and a journey that I am happy to share 
because I look forward to finding and connecting with others who 
have struggled or are wrestling with similar questions. 
The more I grapple with these questions, and the more I look to 
the Quaker tradition for help with these questions, the more I am 
convinced that I am not alone. In fact, I have found that this issue 
has deep roots in Quaker soil and am convinced that how we address 
the issue will affect the ways in which Friends live and prophesy in the 
future. 
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But rather than focusing on how to answer the questions I have 
raised, I want to spend most of my time understanding the questions 
and asking them well. Einstein has said that “If I had an hour to save 
the world, I would spend the first 55 minutes defining the problem, 
and five minutes finding the solution.”1
I will show that we have strong reason and historical precedent for 
answering both yes and no to the question of God’s visibility, and will 
look for help from several others—George Fox, Emmanuel Levinas, 
and Gregory Palamas, who was a Quaker before his time. All of these 
have helped me greatly in framing the question and have even helped 
as I have looked for ways to respond to the questions.
thE ProblEmatic QuEstion
Though this question has been bubbling for years in me, it resurfaced 
in an interesting way at the November 2007 QTDG meetings, where 
we heard a lively set of papers about our Quaker understandings of 
sacrament.2 It was clear from the discussion that this is a controversial 
and important question needing further attention. As I was 
moderating—or clerking, rather—it seemed to me that the question 
that evening on which all of the discussion about sacraments seemed 
to turn was the question of whether or not divine experience could 
be experienced directly and in unmediated ways, or whether it was 
somehow always mediated? So, that is one question I hope to pick 
up and work on further. This present discussion, then, can be seen 
as a continuation of that crucial question of sacraments that has 
implications for how we understand and experience the presence of 
God in our midst. Can God be seen? Can God be experienced, and if 
so, then how? 
Drawing from the Quaker past, this interest has also been a point of 
central importance. There are of course many ways that Quakers have 
been distinctively prophetic in Western Christianity and culture, but 
it just may be that the most vital of those prophetic contributions has 
been the possibility and the centrality of experience with the divine. 
The tension between mediated and unmediated experience is present 
throughout the tradition, however, since even as the testimonies of 
direct experience of the divine abound, cautious clarification is often 
given acknowledging the limitations of our divine knowledge. 
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The tensions are not just between different Quakers, but are 
present even within the thought of leading Quakers. For example, 
we see George Fox embracing both the visibility and invisibility of 
God, saying “All things are seen, visible and invisible, by the divine 
light of Christ” (Journal, p. 29). Not only is this showing a sort of 
illumination theory of knowledge, whereby all things that are known 
are known by the light of Christ, but he is suggesting that by this light, 
we see even that which is invisible. How is it, then, that we “see the 
invisible?” Was Fox just confused, or was he speaking prophetically? 
Even while he has high claims for our ability to see this divine light, 
and to see all other things by this light, Fox nonetheless admits that 
there is that about God which remains invisible. He writes that “God 
hath opened to me by his invisible power how that every [person] was 
enlightened by the divine light of Christ; and I saw it shine through 
all.” [Journal, p. 33]. Thus, even as he describes the ubiquitous light 
of Christ that shines through everyone, he also acknowledges the fact 
that God’s power is invisible. This is a deep tension that he speaks of 
very matter-of-factly—God’s power is invisible, yet he experiences it 
directly. This tension is so thick as to make a philosopher nervous and 
raise suspicion of contradiction. But I want to explore whether this 
tension expressed by Fox, and many others who also gave testimony 
to direct experience of an invisible God, were merely confused and 
conflicted or speaking truthfully of their experience. I will turn 
now to another expression of this tension—found in the writings of 
Emmanuel Levinas.
lEvinas and thE visibility of god
What then does Levinas write about the invisibility and visibility of 
God? Using the conceptual sense of the word vision, one can imagine 
why Levinas would insist on the invisibility of God. For Levinas, one 
encounters infinity in the face of the Other—a particular human. So 
reducing the infinite to a finite category is not only impossible, but 
the attempt to do so is harmful. In this sense, the Other—and the 
infinite encountered in the Other—is irreducible to a concept and is 
therefore invisible. So it is easy to see why the infinite in its infinity is 
inconceivable and likewise invisible.
I concede and embrace the invisibility of the divine. The difficulty 
is asking whether God is ever visible, and if so, how that is possible 
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in conjunction with God’s invisibility. I was helped in seeing how 
Levinas framed this tension. In the opening pages of his first major 
work, Totality and Infinity, he states that the infinite is invisible. 
This seems to be a clear denial of the visibility and presence of the 
infinite. But in the very next sentence he says that this “invisibility 
does not denote an absence of relation; it implies relations.”3 So is he 
contradicting himself? If not, then what does he mean? Elsewhere, 
in God, Death and Time, he writes that transcendence does not come 
down to the fulfillment of an aiming by a vision.4 He rejects that 
transcendence is something that we see in this intentional way. He 
says quite clearly that “the idea of fulfilling an aiming or intending by 
a vision is out of the question.”5 But later, on the same page, he writes 
of the infinity directly encountered in the face of the Other. He says, 
“It is impossible to elude the other [person] in his exigency, in his 
face, which is extreme immediate exposure, total nudity.”6
Later he expresses this paradoxical visibility and invisibility in 
even sharper distinction saying that in the face of the Other we find a 
“transcendence…without vision, a ‘seeing’ that does not know what it 
sees.”7 Let me emphasize that again—in the face of the Other we find 
a “transcendence… without vision, a ‘seeing’ that does not know what 
it sees.” How is this possible? Is he again confused and contradictory 
within one sentence? Or is it possible that he is speaking of two types 
of vision? Perhaps one vision is a vision that encompasses the subject 
with complete thought, while the other is a raw, direct, though 
incomplete, encountering?
There are other equally perplexing formulations of what must 
either be a contradiction or a paradox. He says that the “in” of in-
finite can be taken in two ways—that which is not finite, or that which 
is within the finite. So Levinas is saying that that which is not finite—
the infinite—is present within the finite. 
Two more examples of real or apparent contradictions are 
“wakefulness without intentionality”8 and “attention without 
exposition.”9 Both references speak of the possibility of being 
attentively aware of the infinite even though it is something one 
neither could have expected nor have explained. But the fact that one 
cannot expect it or explain it does not remove it from the possibility 
of awareness.
Though this is perhaps surprising coming from a postmodern 
philosopher, Levinas appears to be saying that direct—immediate—
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awareness of the infinite is possible, even though it is unpredictable 
and non-explicable and uncontainable. He sees the invisible infinity 
directly in the visible and finite face of the Other. This is where Levinas 
shows himself to be a true Quaker, I think (despite his being Jewish), 
since he sees that of God in everyone. 
to sPEak or to rEmain silEnt?
By this point in the discussion, perhaps I have done nothing but 
show that Quakers and Levinas have encountered this paradox of the 
visibility and invisibility of God, and they have tried in various ways 
to express this paradox. One might wonder why a philosopher should 
attempt to say anything about such a matter to begin with. If it is 
a mystery, then it seems that speaking philosophically about such a 
matter can only kill the mystery. The last thing I want to do is to kill 
this mystery, so why do anything other than pass it over in silence?10 
I will be honest that the reason I am looking at this is because 
this is an issue I am trying to work out for myself. I am trying to 
wrestle through competing intuitions and testimonies that I have 
encountered. On the one hand is the testimony of others and my own 
experience that suggests to me the possibility of direct communion 
with the divine. On the other hand is my acknowledgement of 
the impossibility of finding words or conceptions that capture this 
experience, along with the awareness of the harm that can and has 
been done by those claiming intimate knowledge of the divine. One 
testimony or intuition is likely to negate the other, yet I want to find 
a way to preserve them both. Why not just declare paradox and leave 
it alone? Why be any more specific than that? 
For some, that may be all that is needed, but I find that I need 
more help than that in preserving the mystery. I want to help protect 
my experiences and these deep intuitions from the voices (internal 
and otherwise) that deny the possibility of encountering the divine on 
account of the impossibility of conceiving of God. Yet, I also am aware 
of the dangers that come with affirming the possibility of encountering 
the divine—the dangers of destroying that mystery by domesticating 
or misusing it—and I want to guard myself against those as well. I am 
listening and speaking about this not to let words solve the problem, 
but to help preserve the mystery in which I can eventually rest in 
silence.
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In my quest to preserve this paradoxical mystery, I have found 
much aid recently from Gregory Palamas, a 14th century Orthodox 
writer. In the 11th and 13th centuries, Eastern and Western Christians 
were debating this central issue of the direct knowability of God. In 
the West—Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and his view of the distant 
God won out over Bernard of Clairvoux’s (1091-1153) view of an 
intimate God, and thus began scholasticism. But in the East, Symeon 
the New Theologian (949-1022) and his view of an intimate God 
won out over Stephen of Nicomedia and his picture of a distant 
God.11 The West sided with the impossibility of directly encountering 
God, while in the East the same debate went a different direction. 
The Reformation, with some notable exceptions, did not reform on 
this central issue, and the God of the West was viewed as one that 
could only be experienced in a mediated way. This is probably why 
Fox and the Quakers did not find that the Western Church spoke to 
their condition. One is not surprised, then, to find a deep connection 
between the Friends and the Orthodox (though on the issue of form, 
there are some obvious differences). So, what was taking place on the 
other side of the world? 
grEgory Palamas (1296-1359)—bEyond knowing 
and unknowing
Gregory Palamas affirmed the transcendence of God by using the 
via negativa—negative theology—to say what God was not. And he 
used the apophatic approach to say, with others, that “Thou art God 
ineffable, invisible, incomprehensible.”12 Yet, at the same time, he 
defended the possibility of seeing the light of God directly. Bringing 
this paradox to a fine point, he writes, “For God is not only beyond 
knowledge, but also beyond unknowing.”13 
Gregory also provided a distinction—a way of understanding the 
question—that I have found tremendously helpful in preserving this 
paradox of God’s invisibility and visibility. The distinction he makes is 
between divine essence and divine energies. Gregory writes that God’s 
essence—God’s nature—is absolutely invisible to us. But there is that 
of God—God’s energies—which comes directly from God and is 
uncreated.14 It is this (God’s energies) that we may see. The analogy 
he uses is that of seeing light from the sun, which, while not being 
the sun itself, is still in some way a direct contact with the sun. Or 
consider the way we look at a fire and see flames and feel heat; still 
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we do not encounter the “essence” of fire. The “energies” would 
be analogous to the light and heat being emitted from the fire, but 
the “essence” of the fire would be inaccessible to us. He writes that 
“The rays [of God’s energies] are consequently visible… although the 
divine essence is absolutely invisible.”15
This distinction is one that has helped many in this tradition speak 
of and practice direct encounter with the divine without falling into 
pantheism. This distinction also protects one from claiming to be 
God. Just as the bush that Moses observed was burning without being 
consumed, so he describes how one might see or encounter God 
without becoming the fire itself. Even though the bush is dwelling 
in the fire, it does not take on the nature of fire. So we may speak of 
direct dwelling in God without becoming God. 
He speaks a little more explicitly about this distinction saying 
that “this spiritual light is thus not only the object of vision, but it 
is also the power by which we see; it is neither a sensation nor an 
intellection, but is a spiritual power, distinct from all created cognitive 
faculties.”16 But this still retains greater ambiguity than would please 
most philosophers. Nonetheless, this is the greatest degree of clarity 
at this point that I can muster. I am writing about this without having 
figured it out, and I write in attempt not to figure this out completely 
because I am not sure that is possible. Philosophy certainly can and 
certainly has in some cases, played the role of demystifying and 
demythologizing, and I want to avoid that trap. Instead, I am trying 
to think as clearly as appropriate in order to protect that mystery. I 
am doing this as part of my own journey, but invite others to join me 
in helping speak of boundaries that might protect the space where 
mystery is allowed to live and breathe freely. 
living from this QuEstion
In our treatment of the question of the visibility or invisibility, my 
respected colleague, Jeff Dudiak, took on the additional task of 
explaining Levinas to those unfamiliar with his philosophy, and though 
there is a wide variety of interpretations of Levinas (made possible by 
the difficulty in comprehending the writing of Levinas), I will say that 
I think he has presented Levinas very accurately. I also agree with him 
in explaining why God might be inclined to “disappear”. As Dudiak 
says so well in the companion essay, God is that which turns me to the 
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other, and turns the other to me. But God remains invisible in order 
to get out of the way of me loving my neighbor. One can easily see 
and even experience what it is like to seek that of God in my neighbor, 
but to miss truly seeing my neighbor because I’m only looking for the 
divine residing therein. 
I agree that there are significant ways in which God’s essence is 
utterly invisible to us. I am inclined to think, though, that these can 
all be true without eliminating the possibility of directly encountering 
God’s energies. These are not the terms that Levinas uses, but it seems 
entirely compatible with the paradox of which he speaks. 
For me, at least, this way of framing the question helps me keep 
either side of this paradox from collapsing and overwhelming the 
other side. So now I find myself with this refined question: Instead 
of asking whether God is visible or invisible, I now ask, “In what 
ways is God invisible and in what ways is God visible?” Or, “How is 
it impossible for us to know God immediately; how is it possible for 
us to encounter God directly?” This does not solve the mystery, but 
helps me live inside the mystery of encountering and loving God and 
neighbor. The mystery just seems to get more magnificent rather than 
becoming smaller. 
Asking such a question has implications for how we view the 
sacraments, and all of the discussion revolving around those topics in 
an earlier issue. If one begins looking for ways in which God’s energies 
are directly encountered in all of God’s creation, then that implies that 
there is a way in which the divine is encountered directly in all of one’s 
interactions with God’s creation. It opens up an intimidating range 
of ways in which I might encounter God. If this is true of sparrows, 
and lilies, rocks and trees, then how much more so is it true of my 
interactions with my neighbor? If there is “that of God” in everyone, 
and it is possible for me to engage that reality directly, what glorious 
weight does it bring to every interaction with my neighbor?
Each portion of the question acts as a sort of balance to the other 
portion of the question. Once I become aware that God is directly 
present in all things, quickly the danger of pantheism arises, as does 
the concern that I may give divine weight to what is really only a 
distorted view of God’s goodness. So the part of the question that 
asks how God remains invisible is a profound reminder that there 
are many ways in which I can idolize the very creation that God 
indwells. Asking the question in this way opens up the possibilities for 
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encountering the indwelling divine presence. But it also opens up the 
possibilities for idolatry. 
Quakers have obviously been aware of the possibility of idolatry 
when it comes to sacraments, and have played a prophetic role in this 
regard. But perhaps it is time for us to extend our prophetic reach. 
Not only are external religious forms open to idolatry, but internal 
religious ideas are also open to becoming idolatrous. Why are inward 
pictures of God any less vulnerable to idolatry than external pictures 
of God? Perhaps the inward pictures are even more vulnerable to 
idolatry, since I may be more likely to think that my inward picture 
of God as God’s essence, which is utterly unknowable. By asking how 
God’s essence is invisible, I perhaps open up new areas of my life for 
examination. I must now look not only at outward forms to see if I 
am idolizing them, but now I must also examine my internal forms. 
It is not being external that makes them idols, or being internal that 
makes them real. It is whether or not I presume to have captured 
God’s essence in anything.
This way of asking the question has exponentially increasing 
ramifications. It opens me up to new awareness of idolatry, and it 
also opens me up to new awareness of divine presence. Approaching 
the issue of visibility and invisibility in this way is dangerous, and it 
means that there are more ways of being idolatrous than I formerly 
thought possible. But it also means that there are more ways of 
encountering the divine than I thought possible. This means that my 
ways of interacting with my neighbors and God are not under my 
control to the degree that may be comfortable. This is terrifying! And 
in some ways, it seems terrible. But in fact, the more I walk into the 
implications of this all-pervasive question, the more I realize that this 
is terribly good.
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